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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the grant of the Trial Court (Honorable John R. Anderson
of the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, Roosevelt Division,
State of Utah the "Trial Court") of a post-remand summary judgment and final judgment.
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-

2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(a)

Did the Trial Court err when it held that Uintah Basin Medical Center

("UBMC") had just cause to terminate Leo W. Hardy, M.D.'s ("Dr. Hardy") (i.e. no
material issue of fact existed) contract thereby taking this fact issue away from the jury?
(i)

Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine whether

Dr. Hardy's contract termination was capricious, in bad faith, or illegal?
(b)

Did the Trial Court err by considering and accepting as true UBMC's post

hoc justifications for Dr. Hardy's contract termination to explain its just cause
termination of the contract?
(c)

Did the Trial Court have jurisdiction to order the parties to file briefs on the

remaining issue?
(d)

Did the Trial Court err in treating the briefings as a motion for summary

judgment when the Trial Court requested "a brief on the remaining issue"?
Standard of Review: The Trial Court's application of the law to the undisputed
facts in a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See Uintah Basin

1

Med Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92,1j 7, 54 P.3d 1165, 1167, a copy of which is included in
the Addendum as Exhibit "A" (stating that "'In deciding whether the trial court correctly
granted [summary] judgment as a matter of law, we give no deference to the trial court's
view of the law; we review it for correctness.'") (citations omitted).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no statutes,
constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding, and Disposition Below
This is a breach of contract case involving a professional services contract for
pathology services (the "Agreement") entered into by Dr. Hardy and UBMC.1 The
Agreement, executed on November 29, 1994, recited no termination date, but instead was
terminable "for just cause." Dr. Hardy performed under the Agreement to the complete
satisfaction of all concerned, i.e. doctors, patients, medical staff, and UBMC
administration. No member of the UBMC administration or medical staff ever expressed
any concern whatsoever over Dr. Hardy's performance between November of 1994 and
July 1996. UBMC terminated the Agreement on July 18, 1996.
In the spring of 1996, Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") contacted UBMC to
inquire whether UBMC would be interested in hiring a full-time pathologist who was
also certified as an emergency room physician. UBMC invited Dr. Allred to visit the
hospital and shortly thereafter, on July 18, 1996, the UBMC Board of Trustees (the
1

A true and correct copy of the Agreement is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "B."
2

"Board") voted to terminate Dr. Hardy's AprecmciV
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director of pathology and part-time emergency room physician.
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Hardy's "just cause" agreement was enforceable under Utah law.
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enforceable under Utah law, and the question of whether UBMC had just cause to
terminate the Agreement was for a jury to decide as a question of fact,
t
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The Trial Court
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boards could be bound h* the Agreement or whether the Agreement was voidable by a
successor board. On April * . 2000. u^ 1 rial Court ruled that the Agreement could not be
enfo
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the eleven-member board in place when the Agreement was terminated had three new
2

See Ruling of Honorable John R " 1 1 i = 1 s : 1 1 iat : • :1 "" p 1 il 6, 2000, a true and correct copy
of which is inch ided in the A ddei 1 :ii in 1 as E: ::! lit it ' 'C ' "
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members, it was a successor board and hence it could terminate the Agreement at any
time. On that basis, the Trial Court denied Dr. Hardy's renewed motion for summary
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of UBMC.
On June 1, 2000, Dr. Hardy filed a Notice of Appeal, thereby appealing the Trial
Court's order and judgment granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment entered
on May 18, 2000. On August 30, 2002, this Court issued an opinion holding that because
the contract involved a proprietary function, it was enforceable against successor boards
if the contract was for a reasonable duration. See Ex. A at ^J18. This Court remanded the
case back to the Trial Court instructing the court to develop the record and to determine
the scope of the "just cause" provision.
On February 18, 2003, UBMC filed its Post-Remand Motion for Summary
Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion to Bifurcate. On April 15, 2003, Dr. Hardy filed
his Opposition to the Post-Remand Motion for Summary Judgment requesting, inter alia,
that additional discovery be taken in order to develop the record pursuant to this Court's
direction on remand. The Trial Court did not allow additional discovery and granted
UBMC's Post-Remand Motion for Summary Judgment by Ruling dated June 12, 2003
(the "2003 Ruling").3 See R. 1624-26, in which the Trial Court held that the contract
"cannot be viewed as including a reasonable duration." (R. 1625). The Trial Court also
concluded that "the intended scope of the just cause clause provided limited discretion to
future boards, and is unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other contracts
typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical professionals,
3

A true and correct copy of the 2003 Ruling is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "D."
4

and as such the contract's duration was unreasonable making the contract unenforceable,
" Id
T In I ii.il K \ ml iikult its dcci >iun ba^td on no additional discovery, even though
Dr. Hardy requested additional depositions and I In ^ * oml otdeird d n d o p t n m t <d llir
record. Dr. Hardy did, however, submit a declaration regarding his understanding of the
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develop the record as ordered by this Court. In addition, the Trial Court did not allow the
taking ( I Mi ^ a>nt 1, Stewart s ( IJi. Stewart ) deposition, another physician at UBMC
whom 1 r.!','.!! i"!.!

"-, '.niuottd !, « l f a i d \ \

I \\*<

\\\ '.! ' - ' " ! '.'.mp!1, dismissed

Dr. H a r d y ' s Agreement as "atypical." Notwithstanding, the Trial Court opined, without
supporting evidence, thai

ivhen comparing Di. iiaid) i contract to other medical

professionals (\ pit rills t lift u d inlu In Minlrili \\ hin \\h d u d I t nit i lli< u s I in i|ouh of
these contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision allowing either party to
terminate the contract after giving the appropriate notice." (R. 1624-25). Dr. Hardy was
i ul ill i" di tiM ondm I disi m e n in in idluit In i \ p l mi lln u a s u n > ( i n 111* l.mguage in
his Agreement.

The Trial Court's refusal to allow additional discovery is in complete

disregard ot this Court's directive to the trial I curt to develop the record.

A true and correct cop>
Exhibit a F "

I I i llaid) s declaration i> included in the Addendum as

^

On July 31, 2003, Dr. Hardy, by and through his counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal
from the final judgment dated July 10, 2003 of the Honorable John R. Anderson, Eighth
Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, Roosevelt Division.5
On March 3, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the
Trial Court's granting of summary judgment to UBMC and remanded the case to the
Trial Court "for further proceedings consistent with" its opinion. See Uintah Basin Med.
Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App. 92, 110 P.3d 168, a copy of which is included the
Addendum as Exhibit "G." The Utah Court of Appeals determined that:
[o]n appeal, we must decide whether summary judgment was
proper in this case. Specifically, we must determine (a)
whether the trial court properly interpreted the "just cause"
provision, (b) whether the Agreement is for a reasonable
duration as a matter of law, and (c) whether any questions of
fact justify remand to a finder of fact.
Id. at ^f 8. Although not presented for review by Dr. Hardy, the court began with an indepth analysis of the meaning of the "just cause" provision in Dr. Hardy's agreement
with UBMC, ultimately finding that the "just cause" provision in the Agreement is
unambiguous "and is ordinarily understood to provide employers with power to terminate
an employee for legitimate business reasons and in the interest of improving client
services as long as the justification is not a mere pretext for a capricious, bad faith, or
illegal termination." Id. at ^f 17. According to the Utah Court of Appeals, the issue

5

A true and correct copy of the Judgment is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "F."
6

remains, then, whether or not UBMC had just cause to tern :nntr t!

« - - ••-

Hardy.6
^

.

icLwi......

;^

:.*, in uvH allowing

additional discovery to develop UBMC's cause for tenr.i

ilu * -vrm :

Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Trial Court "to determine whether the Board
terminated

, - ^ v ...

capricious

d faith,

^ltimaie business reasons or \ \ hether the termination was
'

before it, the court provided an academic analysis of what an employer must show "to
prove it termiix^v* an employee for just cause, a matter -. m^* impression for Utah
V.

i In ILi 1 ii il nil i ui i

I 1 1 mi i

an objective good faith reason supported by the facts reasonably believed to be true by
the employer'' thereby allow iiig the jury to "determine the objective reasonableness of the

51 (Md. 2004)).
Prior to the <
' m-i luuit s receipt of the case on remand, the Trial Court ordered

6

The only issues on revie\ .o me uian L,OUI,
"*\ji;> regard; ^au^e were
whether the Trial Court erred in not allowing adt .
iscovery u» M\uop the record
so the scope of the just cause provision could be fairly determined, and whether the Trial
Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine whether or not UBMC had just cause to
terminate the Agreement with Dr. Hardy. For that reason, Dr. Hardy was not required
and did not put on all of his evidence of I JBMC's lack of just cause for the termination of
the Agreement.
A

true and co

JIC i n

oneously submit

7

response to the Trial Court's order, Dr. Hardy filed his Memorandum Regarding the
Remaining Issue of Just Cause (included in the Addendum (excluding exhibits) as
Exhibit "I") asking the Trial Court for additional discovery, and to set the case for trial so
that a jury can determine whether UBMC's decision to terminate the Agreement was
objectively reasonable "and base[d] [] on a reasoned conclusion and facts" UBMC
reasonably believed to be true at the time of termination. See Towson, 862 A.2d at 954.8
Simultaneously, in derogation of the Trial Court's order, and beyond the time for
filing dispositive motions, UBMC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment instead of the
requested "brief on the remaining issue." UBMC did not file a Notice to Submit for
Decision on its Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Trial Court's hearing notice did
not mention a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, without any
notice, on remand the Trial Court improperly treated the just cause issue as one for
summary judgment holding, without allowing additional discovery or requesting
additional evidence, that there is insufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether or not
UBMC's decision to terminate the Agreement was objectively reasonable. Thus, the
Trial Court summarily dismissed Dr. Hardy's claims for breach of contract without full
summary judgment briefing, and more importantly, without applying the required
favorable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.9

8

In response to the Trial Court's order that the parties submit a brief on the "remaining
issue," UBMC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a true and correct copy of which
(excluding exhibits) is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "J."
9

See Ruling and Order of Honorable John R. Anderson dated September 27, 2005, a true
and correct copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "K."

8

Dr. Hardy '?-*v::ls th * Trial Coi irt's latest dismissal :: f his claims becai ise the issi le
of whether or not I BMC s decision to terminate the Agreement for just cause was
objectively reasonable is a jury issue, not one lor i..^ > n». - -nrt to make by weighing the
credibility c f > witnesses ai 1 :i s vidence 1J "' lit 1 addition
jurisdiction when it ordered the parties to file briefs on the remaining issue, and when it
ruled on the briefs, the I run v. ourt did not adhere to the summary judgment stand
Statement of F acts
1.

Dr. Hardy is a board certified pathologist, (K 189).

2.

Li).

ubiness nann

ULUC^;^

county i lospiu

owned by Duchesne County and operated by umvlCb Board ul 1 n*
3.

*... ..
•').

On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into the Agreement

in wi.i^., ,^. *ianty a^wvu ,o provide professional servicer lui , . * >«. c*.» uireclor VM mv.
hospil.V" r.vx*-'/ *•

ihoraton

'

rn^h;^ <

Agreement was taken from, a contract between UBMC and Dr. Joseph J. Sanella ("Dr.
Sanella") (a pathologist ..

*> ..* ..,., lmmedii^wty precede^ *-

modifie d the Ai gree m zi it slig! j!

Interestingly, the Trial Court previously held that "[wjhether Plaintiff had 'just cause to
terminate the contract would be a question of fact for the jury." See Ex. C. UBMC also
previously argued that "[i]t is properly the province of a fact-finder to resolve whether
these reasons constituted 'just cause5 for terminating the Agreement. Such resolution
requires further factual development and, thus, the issue of the existence, or lack of, 'just
cause' cannot be resolved on Dr. Hardy's motion for summary judgment." 1JBMC's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Counterclaim dated July 10, 1998 at p. 12, a true and correct copy of which is included in
the Addendum as Exhibit "L." In this regard, the Trial Court was correct, and had it not
reversed course, this appeal ^ * rotild not have been necessary.
9

Agreement was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by
Bradley D. LeBaron, who was UBMC's administrator and who had authority to enter into
personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. Although the Agreement was executed on
November 29, 1994, it became effective August 1, 1994, the date upon which Dr. Hardy
first began providing pathology services to UBMC. (R. 185-86, 189, 546).
4.

Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides:
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and
continue to bind the parties to the terms hereof until
terminated after (90) days written notice for just cause of
termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties
to a shorter notice period.

(R. 185-86,546).
5.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dr. Hardy agreed to (a) be

available for physician consults to interpret laboratory results; (b) visit the UBMC
hospital weekly for one to two hours to recommend processes and policies to assure
smooth operation of the UBMC laboratory; and (c) undertake teaching activities when
new procedures were introduced. (R. 185-86).
6.

The Board is the entity authorized to terminate personal services contracts.

(R. 546).
7.

Pursuant to the Bylaws, the Board can terminate membership on the

medical staff:
for any purpose reasonably related to the delivery of quality
patient care services, including but not limited to:
(a) The Hospital's ability to provide services related to a
medical specialty or sub-specialty;

10

(b) The Hospital's patient load;
(c)
The determination that granting Medical Staff
membership is inconsistent with the mission, role and purpose
of the Hospital;
(d) The Failure of the practitioner to comply with the terms
of the Hospital or Medical Staff Bylaws, rules and
regulations;
(e) Any other reason specified in these or the Medical Staff
Bylaws or others not specified which are reasonably related to
the delivery of quality patient care.
(R. 994).
8.

On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and to invite

Dr. Allred to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as an emergency room
physician. (R. 290A, 290-91, 304, 545).
9.

Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996,

approximately 90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the Agreement. (R.
189,545).
10.

Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations under the

Agreement satisfactorily and received no complaints whatsoever from UBMC or its
medical staff. After termination of the Agreement, on a few occasions, at the request of
members of the UBMC medical staff and with the approval of the UBMC administration,
Dr. Hardy performed limited pathology services for members of the UBMC medical staff
in Dr. Alfred's absence. (R. 189, 545).
11.

Dr. Joseph J. Sanella was the pathologist who preceded Dr. Hardy and his

contract had language identical to Dr. Hardy's stating that the contract would "continue

11

to bind the parties to the terms [ ] until after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause
termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice period."
(R. 1538).
12.

Dr. Wayne T. Stewart was a radiologist at UBMC and his contract provided

for termination only "(a) for the loss of a licence [sic] to practice in the State of Utah, or;
(b) for the conviction of a felony, or; (c) by the mutual consent of both parties." (R.
1458).
13.

UBMC notified Dr. Hardy that it was terminating the Agreement via letter

dated July 29, 1996, a true and correct copy of which is included in the Addendum as
Exhibit "M." This termination letter did not give any reasons for termination of the
Agreement, but offered "sincere appreciation" for Dr. Hardy's service to the hospital and
its patients.
14.

After UBMC terminated the Agreement, Bradley LeBaron ("Mr. LeBaron)

told Dr. Hardy that he would find just cause by "look[ing] and see[ing] what other kinds
of potential issues might be brought up . . . ." See Deposition of Bradley LeBaron,
relevant cited portions of which are included in the Addendum as Exhibit "N" at p. 126.
15.

At his deposition, Mr. LeBaron testified that UBMC conducted no

investigation into whether or not UBMC needed an on-site pathologist before terminating
Dr. Hardy's Agreement. See id. at pp. 39-40.
16.

UBMC contends that "[i]n July of 1996, UBMC determined that the health,

welfare, and interests of the citizens of Duchesne County would be better served by
terminating Dr. Hardy's contract." (R. 1747).
12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erred when it usurped the jury's role in determining whether or
not UBMC's decision to terminate the Agreement was objectively reasonable. This is a
contract case, not an employment case, and, therefore, Dr. Hardy is entitled to have a jury
determine the reasonableness of UBMC's termination of the Agreement.

In his

counterclaim, Dr. Hardy specifically claimed that UBMC breached the Pathology
Services Agreement.11

The Pathology Services Agreement is just that, a services

agreement, not an employment contract. Both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Trial
Court have treated the Agreement as an employment contract, analogizing this matter to
employment discrimination law and termination of employees for just cause. While Dr.
Hardy believes that he can meet the standard set forth by the Utah Court of Appeals in
the employment context, he is not willing to relinquish his contract claim, which includes
a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Ex. O at ^fi[ 27-30.
A determination of objective reasonableness is one of fact for the jury in most
contexts, including contract law.

in

The issue of whether or not UBMC was objectively

reasonable when it terminated the Agreement is, therefore, a jury question.

11

See Dr. Hardy's Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, a true and correct
copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "O" atfflf23-26.
See e.g., Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889
P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the "[t]est for compliance with the covenant
of good faith in contract is one of reasonableness" for a jury to decide.); see also
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing that reasonableness is a
question of fact for the jury in questions of foreseeability); and Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co.
v. Andrews, 211 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1954) (holding that a jury determines reasonableness
of damages).
13

Likewise, the jury's role is to determine whether UBMC's proffered reason for
termination of the Agreement was pretextual. Under the mistaken impression that Dr.
Hardy's Agreement created an employee-employer relationship, the Utah Court of
Appeals essentially determined that the just cause provision in the Agreement required
treatment similar to the burden shifting analysis in typical employment discrimination
cases.13 In the traditional "burden shifting" analysis for wrongful employee termination,
once an employer proffers a reason for the employee's discharge, the employee must
raise a question of fact as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual in order to proceed
to trial.14 If a question of fact is presented by the employee, then the finder of fact (a jury
in this case) determines whether the employer's proffered reason for discharge of the
employee was in fact pretextual. UBMC's proffered reasons for termination of the
Agreement are pretextual and illusory, proving UBMC's caprice and bad faith.

Dr.

Hardy presented numerous examples of pretext to the Trial Court in his brief on the
"remaining issue," all of which cast doubt on the purported reasons for termination
proffered by UBMC. See Ex. I. Although these examples raise the necessary questions
of fact to survive summary judgment, the Trial Court completely ignored them and failed
to give the proper favorable inferences to Dr. Hardy as required at the summary judgment
stage.

13

As already mentioned, although Dr. Hardy believes that there are distinctions between
the present contract case and the typical employment case, since the Utah Court of
Appeals pointed to the employment context for authority, Dr. Hardy will address the
issues as outlined by the Court of Appeals.
14

See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973).
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The Trial Court also erred when it treated the just cause arguments and briefs on
the remaining issue as a motion for summary judgment.

The Trial Court, without

jurisdiction over the case,15 directed the parties to simultaneously file "a brief on the
remaining issue." See Ex. H. In response, Dr. Hardy briefed the "just cause" issue,
providing an outline of how the issue should be treated procedurally, and providing a
sketch of the factual issues that Dr. Hardy would present at trial. See Ex. I. Dr. Hardy
also reminded UBMC and the Trial Court that both had previously stated that just cause
is a question of fact for the jury. See Exhibits C and L. In his brief, Dr. Hardy also asked
the Trial Court to allow additional discovery, specifically of Dr. Wayne Stewart whose
deposition was never completed because of UBMC's objections and instruction to him
not to answer several questions at his deposition.16 Additionally, Dr. Hardy asked the
Trial Court to set this case for trial since both parties, the Trial Court, and the Utah Court
of Appeals believed the just cause issue to be one of fact for the jury's determination.
In response to the Trial Court's order that the parties simultaneously file briefs on
the remaining issue, UBMC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. See Ex. J. This was
not in keeping with the Trial Court's order because the parties were not asked to make

As of March 22, 2005, the date on which the Trial Court ordered the parties to file
briefs on the remaining issue, the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction of this case as it
had not been remanded to the Trial Court. The Utah Court of Appeals set the date of
May 2, 2005, as the date upon which the remittitur would occur pursuant to Rules 36 and
48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
16

See September 29, 2003 letter from Blaine J. Benard to John P. Harrington wherein
UBMC agreed to continue the deposition of Dr. Stewart, included in the Addendum as
Exhibit "P."
15

simultaneous motions for summary judgment, but to brief the "remaining issue.'
Moreover, it was well past time for dispositive motions to be filed, and UBMC never
filed a notice to submit its Motion for Summary Judgment for decision. Instead, the Trial
Court set a hearing date on the "remaining issue" without mentioning a motion for
summary judgment. Dr. Hardy reasonably expected the Trial Court to review the briefs
on the "remaining issue" and to set a trial date at that hearing.
To the extent, however, that the Trial Court treated the briefs on the "remaining
issue" as a motion for summary judgment, it is important to note that the Trial Court did
not adhere to the summary judgment standard because it did not construe all facts
presented and inferences arising from those facts in a light most favorable to Dr. Hardy.
Furthermore, the Trial Court failed to follow the procedures associated with summary
judgment motions, e.g., allowing Dr. Hardy to file a memorandum in opposition, issuing
a ruling only after a Notice to Submit for Decision was filed, etc.
Finally, the Trial Court erred in granting UBMC's Motion for Summary Judgment
because whether or not UBMC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in every contract, including the Agreement here, is a question of fact for the jury.
As a result of the Trial Court's dismissal of Dr. Hardy's counterclaim, he has been
deprived of his right to have a jury determine whether or not UBMC breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated the Agreement under
the just cause provision. This claim cannot be ignored as it was plead at the outset and
17

Interestingly, UBMC made no mention of Rule 56 at oral argument. See Transcript of
Oral Argument included in the Addendum as Exhibit "Q."
16

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in every contractual relationship.
While this is an alternative claim to Dr. Hardy's contract claim, it is part and parcel of the
"remaining issue" of whether or not UBMC had just cause to terminate the Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT USURPED THE JURY'S ROLE
IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT UBMC'S DECISION TO
TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE.
A.

This is a Contract Case, Not an Employment Case, and, Therefore, Dr.
Hardy is Entitled to Have a Jury Determine the Reasonableness of
UBMC's Termination of the Agreement.

Dr. Hardy's claims against UBMC are contract claims.

In his counterclaim

against UBMC, Dr. Hardy specifically claimed that UBMC breached the Pathology
Services Agreement. See Dr. Hardy's Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint
(Ex. O) at TflJ 23-26.

The Pathology Services Agreement is just that, a services

agreement, not an employment contract. Both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Trial
Court have incorrectly treated the Agreement as an employment contract, analogizing this
matter to employment discrimination law and just cause termination of employees.
While Dr. Hardy believes that he can meet the standard set forth by the Utah Court of
Appeals in the employment context, he is not willing to relinquish his contract claim,
which includes a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Ex. O at fflf
27-30.

17

Equally important is the fact that Dr. Hardy was not an employee of UBMC, but
1 Q

an independent contractor with a services agreement.

It is not unusual for service-based

doctors to have service agreements, instead of employment contracts with hospitals
because they are specialists.19 Dr. Hardy's status as an independent contractor, combined
with his claim against UBMC for breach of the Pathology Services Agreement, support
his contention that this is not an employment case, but a breach of contract case.
In the employment law context, courts are careful not to allow the fact finder to
put itself in the place of the decision makers because those decision makers have a
greater degree of familiarity with the employee's history, they deal with the employee on
a day-to-day basis, they know the subtle complexities of the situation, and they are not at
arm's-length.

Employers are, therefore, given more deference to make decisions

regarding the hiring and firing of employees, and the jury is not allowed to second guess
the employer. By contrast, the decision to terminate a contract for just cause is not
The difference between an employee and an independent contractor is that with an
independent contractor, the company does not control how the work is done. In other
words, the company does not control the method of accomplishment of the work. See
Ludlow v. Indus. Comrn'n, 235 P. 884 (Utah 1925) (citations omitted). UBMC never
controlled how Dr. Hardy performed pathology services or operated his pathology
laboratory. In addition, Dr. Hardy certainly meets the traditional IRS 20 factor test to be
considered an independent contractor. See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, a true and
correct copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "R." Moreover, since
UBMC did not withhold employment related taxes, it did not consider him to be an
employee.
19

See e.g., Bonney Motor Express, Inc. v. U.S., 206 F.Supp. 22, 29 (E.D. Va. 1962)
where the court noted: "'Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians,
contractors, subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow in
independent trade, business or profession, in which they offer their services to the public,
are not employees.'" (citation omitted).
18

provided the same deference or discretion because the situation deals with business
transactions, not day-to-day personnel decisions.

The arm's-length nature of those

business transactions requires the fact finder to be more critically involved in determining
the reasonableness of contract decisions and to verify that the termination decision is not
fueled simply by the terminating party's desire to obtain a better deal. The focus is on
one business transaction—the contract—and not on a long employment history.
UBMC, just as any party to a contract, is subject to a determination of whether or
not its termination of the Agreement with Dr. Hardy was reasonable. This is a jury
question, and in the contract context, UBMC's decision and purported reasons for
termination should not be accorded any special deference. The Trial Court erred in this
matter because it took this issue away from the jury and accorded deference to UBMC's
purported reasons for termination of the Agreement.
B.

UBMC Breached the Contract it Had With Dr. Hardy.

This is a contract case as evidenced by the legal position UBMC has taken over
the past nine years. Throughout this litigation, UBMC has contended that because it is a
county entity, UBMC must "make contractual decisions that best serve the tax-paying
citizen and the community." See Ex. L at p. 9. Essentially, UBMC has argued that
because it is a non-profit entity serving the public, it may unilaterally terminate a contract
if UBMC believes that the contract no longer serves the public interest.20 This argument
cannot prevail, however, because it would mean that all government entities would be
20

In the first decision rendered by this Court in this matter, this Court dispelled that
theory when it found that the Agreement was no different from any other business
contract because it involved a proprietary function. See Ex. A.
19

able to breach a contract with impunity whenever a "better deal" came along. Courts
have consistently held that governmental entities have no such right. See e.g., Park City
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Park City, 879 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting the theory that a governmental entity may breach a contract for policy reasons).
In Georgia Magnetic Imaging, Inc. v. Green County Hosp. Auth., 466 S.E.2d 41
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995) the court rejected the very argument that UBMC has made
throughout this case. The hospital in that case argued that it had "just cause" to terminate
a contract because (1) "the Hospital gained financially from terminating its arrangement";
and (2) "it improved its quality of patient care" by entering into a new contract that
allowed the hospital to provide 24-hour rather than part time services. Id. at 45. The
Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the hospital's argument stating that ". . . even in the
interest of providing better patient care, the hospital authority was not justified in
terminating the contracts purely because, in its judgment, the contracts proved to be
financially detrimental or because it was able to strike a better deal with someone else."
Id.
Like the hospital in Georgia Magnetic, UBMC claims (albeit after-the fact) that it
terminated the Agreement because the "health, welfare, and interests of the citizens of
Duchesne County would be better served by terminating" the Agreement. (R. 1747).
Specifically, Mr. LeBaron testified that terminating the Agreement was a better deal for
UBMC because Dr. Allred would live and pay taxes in the community, the hospital
would have a full-time pathologist on-site, and Dr. Allred could work in the emergency
room. See Ex. N at pp. 39, 41, & 95. UBMC cannot, however, simply terminate Dr.
20

Hardy's Agreement because it believes it is getting a "better deal." See e.g., Heiner v.
SJ. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("It is a long-standing
rule in Utah that persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own
terms without the intervention of the courts to relieve the other party from the effects of a
bad bargain.")

Even if UBMC's post-hoc justifications are taken as true, these

justifications do not permit UBMC to breach the Agreement without paying damages to
Dr. Hardy for the breach.
Although there is an accepted contract theory that allows parties to breach a
contract when the breaching party finds "it difficult or uneconomic to perform" the
contract it has entered into, the breaching party is required to pay damages for the socalled "efficient breach."

See Howard O. Hunter, CONTRACT THEORY, REMEDIAL

CHOICES, AND RELATIONSHIPS,

Modern Law of Contracts § 1:3 (2004). The origin of

"efficient breach" lies in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s theory that a party can
either perform under a contract or pay damages for nonperformance.
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

See OLIVER

235-36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard

University Press 1963).21 Legal economists and jurists, such as Judge Richard A. Posner,
have expanded on Justice Holmes' theory, finding that at times it makes more economic
sense for a party to break its promise (breach the contract) because "[t]he promisor []
discovers] that his performance is worth more to someone else." Patton v. MidContinent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988). If this is the case, Judge Posner
21

Justice Holmes' theory is generally "interpreted to mean that a contracting party has a
lawful option to perform or not." Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes
on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1085 (2000).
21

believes that "efficiency is promoted by allowing [the promisor] to break his promise,. ..
." Id21 In such situations, the breaching party is nonetheless liable for the "value of the
bargain" to the non-breaching party. See Modem Law of Contracts § 1:3. Opponents of
"efficient breach" contend that allowing a party to breach a contract because it is no
longer economically beneficial ignores "the sanctity of contract and the moral obligation
to honor one's promises." See 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 12.3 (2005). In addition,
"efficient breach" ignores the transaction costs involved in negotiating the original
contract. See id. But more importantly, "efficient breach" trivializes the process and
deters people from entering into written contracts.
Judge Posner bases his acceptance of "efficient breach" contract theory on the
premise that performance of the subject contract is somehow a losing deal or
"uneconomic" for one of the parties. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 2d § 4.9 (1977). UBMC cannot reach that threshold because there is
no evidence that the Agreement was "uneconomic" or a "losing deal" for the hospital or
the citizens of Roosevelt. There was no such evidence at the time that UBMC terminated
the Agreement and there is no such evidence now. This is manifest by the fact that
UBMC still uses Dr. Hardy's services on occasion because Dr. Allred is no longer
employed by UBMC.

If the jury were to find that UBMC's proffered reasons for

termination of the Agreement (i.e., that the hospital would benefit from having an on-site
22

Judge Posner theorizes that in some situations compelling "completion of [a] contract
would [] result in a waste of resources" which "the law does not compel [] but remits the
victim to a simple damages remedy." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 2d § 4.9 (1977).
22

pathologist and additional help in the emergency room) rendered the Agreement
"uneconomic" or a "losing deal" for UBMC, then at the very least, Dr. Hardy is entitled
to damages for the "value" of his contract for UBMC's purposeful, "efficient" breach of
the Agreement.
Dr. Hardy committed to provide pathology services in the rural community of
Roosevelt and negotiated a contract with UBMC that would allow him to do so. UBMC
purposefully and knowingly breached the Agreement allegedly because hiring Dr. Allred
was more beneficial to the hospital and the citizens of Roosevelt than honoring its written
agreement with Dr. Hardy. Whether or not, in hindsight, UBMC's breach was truly
"efficient" is irrelevant since the theory of "efficient breach" requires the breaching party
(UBMC) to compensate the non-breaching party (Dr. Hardy). UBMC's breach was
either "efficient" or it wasn't. Regardless, pursuant to the theory of "efficient breach,"
UBMC is liable to Dr. Hardy for its purposeful breach of the Agreement. Once again,
since the Trial Court's rulings have taken these issues away from the jury and deprived
Dr. Hardy of his day in court, this Court should reverse the Trial Court and remand the
case for a trial of these issues.
C.

The Jury's Role is to Determine the Objective Reasonableness of
UBMC's Decision to Terminate the Agreement.

In its decision in Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, the Utah Court of
Appeals decided, on its own and without briefing on the issue, to analogize this matter to
the employment context and set forth what an employer must show to prove that "it

23

terminated an employee for just cause."

The Utah Court of Appeals "agree[d] with the

majority of courts and adopt[ed] the objective reasonableness approach" requiring "an
employer to justify termination with an objective good faith reason supported by facts
reasonably believed to be true by the employer" at the time of termination. Ex. G at ffl|
22-23.

This standard, however, does not take away from the jury's fact-finding

responsibilities; it simply changes them and requires the jury to "determine the objective
reasonableness of the employer's decision to discharge." Towson, 862 A.2d at 950-51.
The Utah Court of Appeals' decision relied primarily on two employment cases,
Towson and Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998), both of
which define "objective reasonableness" and carefully analyze a jury's role in just cause
employment cases.

The Towson court held that "a jury's role is to determine the

objective reasonableness of the employer's decision to discharge, which means that the
employer act in objective good faith and base its decision on a reasoned conclusion and
facts reasonably believed to be true by the employer."

Towson, 862 A.2d at 954

(emphasis added). Cotran goes ones step further and holds that:
[t]he proper inquiry for the jury [] is not, "Did the employee
in fact commit the act leading to dismissal?" It is "Was the
factual basis on which the employer concluded a
dischargeable act had been committed reached honestly, after
23

As noted above, while the Utah Court of Appeals analogized this matter to the
employment context, this matter is a contract issue between UBMC and an independent
contractor. Unlike the general at will employment legal framework, this dispute focuses
on what the "just cause" provision means in this particular agreement. The Utah Court of
Appeals has now defined the just cause provision in this Agreement and the issue should
be sent to a jury. While Dr. Hardy disagrees with the Utah Court of Appeals' legal
framework, even if not viewed as a contract issue, this Court should remand the just
cause issue for a jury decision.
24

an appropriate investigation and ft i t masons tl lat ai: • i i 1 :)t
arbitrary and pretextual?"
Id. at 42i-ZZ.

Cotran provides further guidance b> m . nung "good cause" as:
fair and honest reasons, regulated by good iaitli ^n i.
a of
the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or c a p t i o u s ,
unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual. A
reasoned conclusion,
:
supported
substantial
evidence gathered through an adequate investigation that
includes notice of the claimed misconduct and a chance for
• the employee to respond.

Id. at 422

there tore, judges the employer's objective reasonableness for

terminalo.

nciiici i:.^re was investigation, reasoned conclusions, and "notice of the

claimed misconduct" whet 1 contradictory evidence is prese nte • :1 I" I ::« eo \ er , tl ic: ii 1 qi in ; '
focuses on what the terminating party believed at the time it terminated the relationship
and not reasons created at a later date.
If given the opportunity
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could present to the jury his facts to show that U B M C ' s purported reasons for terminating
the Agreement are not legitimate. Contrary to I i > \ k 's assertions that Dr. Hardy has no
evid^n- - l V H -

^

acted in bad faith when it terminated the Agreement. Dr. Hardy can show that UBMC
conducted no ii lvestigation either into L,-,. /iilrcu 1 s qualifications or into whether or not
U B M C even needed, i m i 11 m \v p, 1111 1 -1 il "
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economic benefits associated with Dr. Hardy's services or the anticipated economic
benelit wi n u m ^ ./^ . *iu^
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See I eBaron depo. (Ex

K

iardy can also show that U B M C did not terminate the

v

").
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Agreement for poor performance, misconduct, a breach of the Agreement, or failure to
fulfill his obligations, and, in fact, UBMC thanked him for his service. Indeed, many of
UBMC's witnesses testified in their depositions that Dr. Hardy was well-respected and
liked by the doctors and staff at the hospital, which is borne out by the fact that UBMC
still, even to this day, asks Dr. Hardy to help out and work at the hospital.25 Dr. Hardy
will testify that he was not given a reason for the termination at the time the Agreement
was terminated, except for the fact that UBMC decided to hire Dr. Allred. Finally, Dr.
Hardy can show that he was not given a chance to respond to the termination, meaning
that Dr. Hardy was not offered the chance to cure or even address any alleged need for an
on-site pathologist. While UBMC is sure to dispute this evidence, the critical point is
that it is the jury's province, not a judge's, to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and
evidence, and to determine whether it believes UBMC's or Dr. Hardy's version of the
facts.
UBMC mistakenly draws the conclusion from the appellate court's decision that
the Trial Court makes every determination regarding just cause. The standard derived
from the case law relied on by the Utah Court of Appeals clearly does not cut the jury out
of its fact-finding role. Contrary to UBMC's contention that the Utah Court of Appeals
"anticipated the trial court's ruling," the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's
order granting UBMC's motion for summary judgment, remanding the case to the Trial
Court for proceedings "consistent" with its opinion. See Ex. G. Proceedings "consistent"
with the Utah Court of Appeals' decision include sending the just cause issue to a jury. If
25

See id. at pp. 34 & 81-82.
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that there was not an issue of fact, it would have simply affirmed the Trial Court's ruling,
winch it could do on any \ uble buws. It did not do that because it realized that Di. 1 lardy
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Dr. Hardy believes that he has presented sufficient issues of fact suggesting that
I J B M C s decision to terminate the Agreement was pretextual, especially considering the
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Moreover, such reasons do not show what facts

UBMC believed to be true at the time of termination as required under the cases cited by
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jury that such facts were created after the fact and are mere pretext. Dr. Hardy has not
completed discovery, nor has he presented all of his factual evidence on the issue of just
C a n

1

II

' " i 11 mi '

11 "II

I '"'" J 1 1 PL t i 1 > \ 1 11111 n 1 1 1 j 11 i 1 1 1 " 1II 1 1 mi 1 1 1 I 1" I

I II I I 1 I \ "1'" 111! I I 1 I l i t ' g J \ t ' l 1 " l l l t l l l i l l I

opportunity and the Trial Court denied that to Dr. Hardy.

Brad LeBaron admitted at his deposition that he would find a way to justify UBMC's
actions and decision to terminate the Agreement with Dr. Hardy after the fact, that he
would find just cause by u look[ing] and see[ing] what oilier kinds of potential issues
might be brought up
" ^ec Ex. N at p. 126.
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Taking the decision about whether UBMC's termination was objectively
reasonable away from the jury demonstrates clear error on the part of the Trial Court. As
such, this Court should remand this case to the Trial Court for trial.
D.

The Jury's Role is to Determine Whether UBMC's Proffered Reason
for Termination of the Agreement was Pretextual.

The Utah Court of Appeals essentially determined that the just cause provision in
the Agreement required treatment similar to the burden shifting analysis in typical
employment discrimination cases.

In the traditional "burden shifting" analysis for

wrongful termination, once an employer proffers a legitimate business reason for the
employee's discharge, the employee must raise a question of fact as to whether the
proffered reason is pretextual in order to proceed to trial. See McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802-805. If a question of fact is presented, then the finder of fact (a jury in this
case) determines whether the employer's proffered reason for discharge of the employee
was in fact pretextual.

Pretext is shown by "'weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate
reasons for its action . . . " such that a "reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted []
reasons.'" Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Said another way, "pretext is defined as (1) 'An ostensible or professed purpose; an
excuse' and (2) 'An effort or strategy intended to conceal something.'"27

27

Miller v. EBY Realty Group LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000)). In
28

Regarding evidence of pretext, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Miller v.
EBY Realty Group LLC, allowed the terminated employee to produce evidence showing
that the explanation his employer gave him on the da> ' he was terminated was false. See
Milh>v
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reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.'" Exum v. United States
Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)

Olympic

In other words, Dr.

the explanation it gave to him for termination of the Agreement to be true at the time it
was terminated. Giannopoulos

v. Brack & Brock Confections,

Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 411

(

Agreement at the time that U B M C terminated it. See Ex. M. He was simply thanked for
his service and told that he had been replaced.

fact," which in this case is a jury. A jury of Dr. Hardy's peers could easily find U B M C ' s

Miller, the court held that "[pjretext exists when an employer does not honestly represent
its reasons for ter™'~atin£ ° " employee,"
^i

post-hoc justifications to be false and pretextual because there is no evidence that any of
the reasons now given were actually held by UBMC at the time it terminated the
Agreement, or were even considered prior to the termination. UBMC conducted no
business analysis regarding the need for a full-time, on-site pathologist or how, if at all,
having one would benefit the hospital and its patients.28 UBMC failed to provide Dr.
Hardy or anyone reviewing the circumstances of termination, reasons that would justify
terminating the Agreement. UBMC is a sophisticated provider of medical services, and it
is not unreasonable to expect UBMC to substantiate its decision with the facts or credible
reasons.

Besides being unreasonable, investigation and reasoned conclusions are

required as set forth in Cotran. Certainly a jury could find that UBMC's post-hoc
justifications are weak, implausible, and inconsistent.
Once again, the critical issue is that while UBMC and Dr. Hardy will dispute the
evidence and UBMC's proffered reasons for termination, the Trial Court's summary
dismissal has deprived the jury of its role to weigh the credibility of the evidence and
make its choice as to which version of the facts it believes. This is clearly a jury question
and Dr. Hardy has been denied his right to have the jury decide the issue. Moreover,
based on this disputed evidence, the Trial Court was required to draw all inferences in
favor of Dr. Hardy which it clearly did not do.
constitute reversible error.

See Ex. Nat pp. 40-41.
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These actions by the Trial Court

E.

UBMC's Proffered Reasons f or I erminatit

he Agmim
l iU

Pretextual and Illusory, Proving UBMC's Caj
At best, the reasons that might be conjured up t :

*•

..,*. <,.* icnninutk,,. w, o^

Agreement

evidence of any m

Or, UBMC might like to have extra help in the emergency room,

but there is no evidence of any need, and even if there was a neeci. i «. j^nn Masaryk, a
formei ER doctc i at I JBN 1( I I: lad e: :pi essed ai 1 ii ltei est ii 1 reti it i lii lg "'
UBMC's failure to investigate the hospital's pathology and emergency room needs
evidences that UBMC's termination

-e Agreement was pretextual and that the

failure to articulate any "reasoned conclusions" or to investigate as required by Towson
and Cotran is evidence of pretext.

See UBMC Medical St
Addendum as Exhibit "S "

Finally, the deposition testimony and meeting

cung minuiCi uaiwu

. „.c.*^~ ». ...^
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Brad LeBaron, the Chiei
.,f oi utfivi^
osition that there
was no analysis made of tfk, i
isons for hin.
hologist. Where
are the records of UBMC consi.
es performed by
c __. number of pL___. . ^ r .
Dr. Hardy and an estimate of the pathology procedures that could be performed by a fulltime pathologist? Where are the notes of any conversations with the staff physicians
concerning their pathology needs—whether those needs were being met by Dr. Hardy or
not? There is simply no evidence that UBMC had a good reason for hiring Dr. Allred
because he was going to be a full-time pathologist. Dr. Hardy's expert, Dr. Elizabeth
Hammond, will testify at trial that UBMC did not conduct a sufficient investigation of the
hospital's needs for a full-time pathologist. See Ex. N at pp. 40-41
31

UBMC failed to conduct any comprehensive investigation regarding Dr. iiaru) b
replacement, Dr. Allred. Most egregiously, UBMC never contacted the National
Practitioner Databank to inquire whether Dr. Allred had any malpractice claims pending
against him. If it had done so, it would have discovered that Dr. Allred was in the
process of being sanctioned by the State of Florida Board of Medicine at the time he was
hired u*-T TRMC. See id. at pp. 114 115

minutes clearly show that the medical staff did not approve of terminating the
Agreement, did not recommend that the hospital hire Dr. Allred, and that there had been
no complaints about Dr. Hardy's service or performance of pathology services at UBMC.
See Ex. S and UBMC Board of Trustees meeting minutes dated July 18, 1996, included
in the Addendum as Exhibit "T." 32
Certainly these facts cast doubt on the purported reasons for termination proffered
by UBMC and raise the necessary questions of fact to survive summary judgment,
especially since the Trial Court was required to draw all inferences in favor of Dr. Hardy.
Though Dr. Hardy believes that there are no just cause reasons for termination of the
Agreement, he realizes that the objective reasonableness of UBMC's proffered reasons
for termination is a jury question under the Utah Court of Appeals' analysis. Indeed, the
following are jury questions relevant to that determination: (1) Was UBMC's decision to
replace Dr. Hardy with Dr. Allred (even though UBMC admits that Dr. Allred would cost
the hospital more money) an objectively reasonable decision?;

IT

(2) Was it objectively

reasonable for UBMC to hire a pathologist without talking with other pathologists who
worked with him at his previous hospital?; (3) Was it objectively reasonable for UBMC
to hire a full-time on-site pathologist without determining whether there was a real need
for one?; (4) Was it objectively reasonable for UBMC to hire Dr. Allred without
negotiating a contract with him?; and (5) In light of Dr. Hardy's evidence, did UBMC

32

See also Ex. Nat p. 46.

33

UBMC paid for Dr. Allred to relocate from Florida and also paid Dr. Allred a much
higher salary than fees paid under the Agreement with Dr. Hardy. See id. at pp. 77-79.
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make a reasoned business lecis^r
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THE TRIAL
_ THE PARTIES TO
FILE BRIEFS ON 1 HE i
, ISSUE" AND THEN TREATED
THOSE BRIEFS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
On March 22, 2005 the Trial Court, without jurisdiction over the case, directed the

parties to simultaneously file "a brief on the remaining issue." See Ex. H. At that time,
the
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In response to the 1 rial Court's order, Dr. Hardy briefed the "just cause" issue,
providing an outline .... .,.

the issue should be treated procedurally, and providing a

sketch :)f tl le Hi Iiii.ii! issnr. I k ffjirch \ « nil I |»n M nl <il III11.iIII AVr ];\ I I I'l llllllll.iii Il ill1
reminded the Trial Court and UBMC that both had previously stated that just cause is a
question oi lact ;

Court previously held that "[w]hether

Plaintiff had "just e,i^1^,,, U '"^nnin.ife *l>i n »"'i" "

l<i I

i i]ucs1 it m In1 III1 |"iii",

!'t't

Ex. C. This argument is consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals' decision and reliance
34

See e.g., Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305,
305-06 (Utah 1996) (the "trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is
under advisement on appeal ")
33

on Towson and Cotran. In his brief, Dr. Hardy also asked the Trial Court to allow
additional discovery, specifically of Dr. Stewart whose deposition was never completed
because of UBMC's objections and instruction to him not to answer several questions at
his deposition. Additionally, Dr. Hardy asked the Trial Court to set this case for trial
since both parties, the Trial Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals believed the just cause
issue to be one of fact for the jury's determination.
Instead of complying with the Trial Court's order to brief the "remaining issue,"
UBMC filed a motion for summary judgment. See Ex. J. This was not in keeping with
the Trial Court's order because the parties were not asked to make simultaneous motions
for summary judgment, but to brief the "remaining issue." Moreover, UBMC's Motion
for Summary Judgment was improper because the dispositive motion deadline had passed
years earlier, and UBMC did not seek leave of court to file a dispositive motion beyond
the deadline. Dr. Hardy did not respond to UBMC's Motion for Summary Judgment
because he had no indication that the Trial Court would treat the briefs on the "remaining
issue" as a motion for summary judgment.

Indeed, the hearing notice (included in the

Addendum as Exhibit "U") was titled "Notice of Hearing on Remaining Issue," not
"Notice of Hearing on UBMC's Motion for Summary Judgment." In addition, UBMC
never submitted a "Notice to Submit for Decision" as required in Rule 7(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Dr. Hardy had no reason, therefore, to believe that the briefs
would be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
35

To the contrary, Dr. Hardy

At the very least, once the Trial Court decided that it was going to treat the briefs on
the "remaining issue" as a motion for summary judgment, it should have given Dr. Hardy
notice and a chance to respond to UBMC's briefing.
34

reasonably believed that the hearing on me — , n - r —
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motion for summary judgment, the Trial Court did not adhere to the summary judgment
standard because it did not construe all facts presented and inferences arising from those
fir-

Farnsworth Motel, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953) (setting forth the standard for summary
judgment). The Trial Court may disagree with the facts presented by Dr. Hardy, but it
Cll
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The Trial Court completely ignored all of the evidence of pretext discussed above.
The Trial Court also ignored the deposition testimony presented by Dr. Hardy which

doctors (testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Hammond regarding the hiring procedures for hiring
a pathologist—See Deposition of Elizabeth Hammond, M.D., relevant cited portions of

36

See Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) where this Court held
that "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed
eviden.ce, and its sole inquiry should u~ —h^u — material issues of fact exist."

which are included in the Addendum as Exhibit "V"), and disputes as to whether or not
there was any discussion regarding the need for an on-site pathologist (testimony from
Dr. Stewart that he never discussed with anyone at UBMC the hospital's need for an onsite pathologist until Dr. Allred began inquiring about the pathology position at UBMC).
See Deposition of Wayne Stewart, M.D., relevant portions of which are included in the
Addendum as Exhibit "W." These asserted and supported facts controvert the evidence
relied on by UBMC and create genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of
summary judgment.

Furthermore, these issues alone are sufficient to try this case to a

jury, and, therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting UBMC's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
III.

WHETHER OR NOT UBMC BREACHED THE COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING INHERENT IN EVERY CONTRACT,
INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT HERE, IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR
THE JURY.
As a result of the Trial Court's dismissal of Dr. Hardy's counterclaim, he has been

deprived of his right to have a jury determine whether or not UBMC breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated the Agreement. This

It is important to note that Dr. Hammond was designated as Dr. Hardy's expert before
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in November 1999. She has
not, therefore, submitted an expert report, although UBMC did depose her in September
1999. Dr. Hardy intends to submit an expert report for Dr. Hammond containing a full
exposition of the subject matter on which she will testify in compliance with Utah R. Civ.
Pro. 26(a)(3)(B).
38

UBMC argued previously in this case that "a genuine issue of material fact exists with
regard to the issue of just cause." See Ex. L at p. 8. UBMC now wishes to reverse its
course and argue that there are no issues of material fact. The facts have not changed and
there are still issues of material fact. Summary judgment, therefore, is improper.
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claim cannot be ignored as it was plead at the outset and the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is inherent in every contractual relationship. While this is an alternative
c
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whether or not UBMC had just cause to terminate the Agreement.
Dr. Hardy had a contract with UBMC, and, therefore, both parties had a duty to
act in good faith. Di I Iard> has presented sufficient evidence that LbiV
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Utah case law supports Dr. Hardy's contention that bad faith termination of a contract is a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fail dealing '
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the just cause provision and that it failed to do so.40 Bad faith and reasonableness are
clearly jury questions anu
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hear the evidence and then determine whether the facts support recovery under a contract
theory, a just cause termination theory as outlined by the Utah Court of Appeals, or under
a

-

• v.

There are many ways that "a contracting party can exercise a retained contractual
power in bad faith," including in its determination to terminate a contract. Olympus Hills
Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 889 P.2d at 451 (citing Resource Mgmt. Cc>
Weston Ranch &
Livestock Co., Inc., 706 p ^ ' n^R i m- n v.i, i O<KY)
40

Mr. LeBaron testified that in a conversation with Dr. Hardy shortly after termination of
the Agreement, regarding this lawsuit, he told Dr. Hardy that the hospital would find just
cause in order to justify UBMC's termination of the Agreement. Mr. LeBaron admitted
that he woi lid justify UBMC's action- ^n^_ * he-fact c"r>T7v x r nt " 1 1 ^
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court erred when it usurped the jury's role in determining whether or
not UBMC's decision to terminate the Agreement was objectively reasonable. This is a
contract case, not an employment case, and, therefore, Dr. Hardy is entitled to have a jury
determine the reasonableness of UBMC's termination of the Agreement. Likewise, it is
the jury's role to determine whether UBMC's proffered reason for termination of the
Agreement was pretextual.
The Trial Court also erred when it treated the just cause arguments and briefs on
the "remaining issue" as a motion for summary judgment. To the extent, however, that
the Trial Court treated the briefs on the "remaining issue" as a motion for summary
judgment, the Trial Court did not adhere to the summary judgment standard because it
did not construe all facts presented and inferences arising from those facts in a light most
favorable to Dr. Hardy.
Finally, the Trial Court erred in granting UBMC's motion for summary judgment
because whether or not UBMC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inherent in every contract is a question of fact for the jury.
Accordingly, this Court should enter an order reversing the Trial Court's ruling
granting summary judgment in favor of UBMC, and remand this case to the Trial Court

38

for a jury trial. This case has seen its journeys and after almost 10 cars.

u
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allow a jury to decide the matter after both sides ftilly and fairly present their evidence.
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